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Rhetoric, “the art of persuasion,” gets a bad rap among
workers in the mathematical sciences. This is unfor-
tunate, since although mathematics is concerned pri-
marily with the demonstration of formal truth, math-
ematicians do live in the world and need to concern
themselves with persuading students, business agents
and others not on the mathematical team of the im-
portance of their enterprise. The natural revulsion
among keepers of the flame of formal truth for the
dirty instruments and forms of public persuasion is a
handicap (not fatal yet, perhaps, but a handicap none-
theless) in attracting students and obtaining public
support. Thus, a brief history of the origins of rheto-
ric and its relation to the development of logic—math-
ematical and otherwise—can be useful in providing a
view of the relation between those two integral arts
of “fixing” belief, to use the term favored by the phi-
losopher and mathematician C.S. Peirce.
Rhetoric had its institutional roots in the political chaos
in Greece around 400 B.C. following Sparta’s defeat
of Athens and the temporary collapse of democracy.
Although the models of expression favored by rheto-
ricians trace back to Homer and the oral tradition of
heroic action and expression, the availability of tutor-
ing in rhetoric is tied to the period of the restoration
of democracy after the oligarchic tyranny following
the defeat of Athens. During the tyranny, arbitrary
seizure of property and assassination were common,
and, as in recent history in South Africa and Central
America, injustices filled lists waiting for redress.
With the restoration of the democracy, courts were
established to hear claims and grievances. These
courts, in the Athenian pattern, did not have estab-
lished officers, such as judges, prosecutors, and li-
censed defense lawyers. They were made up of groups
of citizens—as many as fifty—who listened to the
grievances of citizens and the defenses of those ac-
cused, and delivered judgment on the spot. In this situ-
ation, cleverness in speaking would provide a strong
advantage for plaintiffs and accused, and as in courts
today, the expression of pain and suffering would
carry a lot of weight. Not surprisingly, some entre-
preneurial individuals offered lessons in speaking to
get maximum benefit from these situations. The best
known of these individuals are Corax and Tisias, to
whom the art of rhetoric is traced by Aristotle.
Imagine the typical case. The “jury” of 50 men sits in
an open theater of sorts while the plaintiff explains
how his brother was beaten to death and his home
seized by the defendant. In his complaint he goes into
great detail about the agonizing pain his brother suf-
fered, the misery of his brother’s wife and children in
the loss of their father, the humiliation of their loss of
privilege and income, the jealous glee of the execu-
tors of the forfeiture and the illicit pleasure they take
in the property to which they have no right—all of
this aimed at arousing the active sympathy and out-
rage of the jury. The defendant parries in the same
terms, pointing to injustices committed by the dead
brother that earned him his fate, the insult and pain
caused by the present claim, the well-known skuldug-
gery of the plaintiff, and how the misery of the
defendant’s wife, children and father was due to the
wretchedness of the home forfeited to the defendant
which has since been transformed through consider-
able effort, expense and good will within the last ten
years into a location of public hospitality.
Since such skill in arguing had a substantial value, it
became a major part of the educational framework.
Teachers of the youth of Athens were expected to pro-
vide experience and training to prepare men to de-
fend themselves against complaint, much as it was
expected that young men would learn to defend them-
selves with weapons. It is hardly surprising then that
the youthful Plato, in observing such processes, would
be appalled that this could be considered a form of
Justice, a search for Truth. And so rhetoric as an art
became the target of special scorn as an educational
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discipline because of its claim to discover truth and
further justice. In his dialogues on rhetoric, specifi-
cally the Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates at-
tack common rhetorical practice as training in mak-
ing the worst appear the better cause. This competed
with training in reasoning, which he called dialectic.
(Although this is a yawing term, cruising across philo-
sophical trade routes, it can generally be taken to mean
discussion logic, or finding questions for exploratory
discussion.) Plato wanted to ask questions and shape
definitions to clarify and comprehend Truth, Justice,
Virtue; in his Academy the mode of dialectic was the
foundation of education.
Fortunately for the western world, one of Plato’s stu-
dents and teaching assistants at the Academy was
Aristotle, who took a differ-
ent view. Aristotle was in-
terested not just in the es-
sential truth and falsity of
methods of thinking and
knowing, he was also inter-
ested in describing how
things worked, practically.
Aristotle’s Rhetoric seems to
have been an outgrowth of
his discussions of rhetoric at the Academy. (Plato must
have decided that the Academy needed to have in-
struction in rhetoric to attract students, but he was
darned if he was going to do that, so he gave the job
to this talented junior staffer.) Aristotle’s approach was
neither to teach merely the Coraxian tricks, or critique
the practice of such tricks, but to ask: what kind of
thing is rhetoric? And his explanation in the Rhetoric
and the larger Organon, of which it is essentially a part,
can be read as an answer to Plato’s concerns, an an-
swer that in a sense follows Plato’s method.
“Plato!” he seems to say, “hold on a minute—you are
getting some things mixed up! First of all, you define
rhetoric in terms of the example of these court pro-
ceedings. That’s far too narrow a definition. Rhetoric
should be described in terms of its situation and its
appeal. Those court proceedings are examples of
speech in judicial situations emphasizing an appeal
to audience emotion. The jury isn’t trained, they have
no standards of justice, no code to enforce, so natu-
rally the most effective appeal is to their sympathy
and anger. But surely that doesn’t define the only type
of speech a citizen needs to do.” In a wonderfully
simple yet profound set of categories, Aristotle estab-
lishes an observation that speech situations are either
judicial, deliberative, or ceremonial (epedeictic). Ju-
dicial speech aims at accusing someone of crimes they
have committed in the past; deliberative speech aims
at recommending policy for the future; and ceremo-
nial speech aims at praising or blaming a person for
their character. These are the only types of speech that
operate with the public at large. Within any of these
categories (think: rows), one may use one of three dif-
ferent appeals (think: columns) that are grounded in
the speaking situation. One may appeal to the feel-
ings and perceptions of the audience (pathos), as in
the court speeches that so appalled Plato. But one may
also base an appeal on one’s own character or reli-
ability (ethos), or on the argument or evidence (logos).
In response to Plato’s iden-
tification of rhetoric with
basically a single mode of
speech (judicial aim with
emotional appeal),
Aristotle’s definition of
rhetoric is a full grid with
lists of terms expanding
each of the nine cells of the
grid. Aiming at comprehen-
siveness of description, he expands the audience ap-
peal, for instance, from appeals to anger and sympa-
thetic sadness to a full description of the kinds of as-
sociations and perspectives different audiences tend
to share. One might say that in so doing, he wrote the
first descriptive psychology. For example, for old men,
happiness takes the form of protection or successful
children while for young men it might be challenge
or opportunity to achieve honor . So if you are speak-
ing to an audience of senior citizens, be aware of this
difference in shaping your material. Young men tend
to pay more active attention to personal slight than
old men, who feel more secure in their established
reputations. This sort of listing-out description easily
expands into an outline that fills several hundred
pages without very much analysis or detailed devel-
opment.
But defining rhetoric is only part of Aristotle’s re-
sponse to Plato. Secondly he points out that it is nec-
essary to distinguish between persuasion relative to
the community at large, and persuasion within a field
of shared assumptions in a particular investigation—
i.e., within a discipline. Within a field of exploration,
❝...it is necessary to distinguish between persua-
sion relative to the community at large, and
persuasion within a field of shared assumptions
in a particular investigation...
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individuals share common terms and assumptions
from which they discover new truths or facts, and
within which they give value to certain observations.
Since those assumptions, truths, and facts are not uni-
versally known, the truth of in-discipline reasoning
is not self-evident to society as a whole. Assumptions
may be passed on with the authority of the discipline,
and thus may not be questioned by the masses, but
that is due to the enforceability of authority, not to
their reasonability. Aristotle’s presentation of logic in
the Organon and the Rhetoric assumes that Plato’s
model for reasoning is the basis for the development
of a discipline, a science. If one assumes, as scientists
and mathematicians too frequently do, that the prin-
ciples and assumptions of scientific discourse are self-
evident in the public arena, one tends to lose debates.
In his discussion of Logic in the Organon (Topics, Cat-
egories, Prior and Posterior Analytics), Aristotle re-
tains this distinction, setting up syllogism as a method
of reasoning from demonstrated premises to demon-
strable conclusions, and setting up dialectic (the basis
of logos in the Rhetoric) as discussion from common
assumptions and opinions that are simply accepted
without needing to be demonstrated. Thus, in doing
rhetoric, you argue from your audience’s opinions.
In science, you argue from demonstrated truths. How-
ever, one must note that just as some audience opin-
ions may be wrong (and the ethical character of the
speaker may be sacrificed in the long run if audiences
perceive him/her to be relying on audience beliefs that
he/she knows are wrong), demonstrated premises
may in the future be discarded by a scientific com-
munity -alchemy, for example. Aristotle points out that
rhetorical argument aims to persuade audiences, not
to do science. Rhetoric (and dialectic) is about public
speaking (and informal discussion), not about under-
standing the nature of the mind, insects, the weather,
or morality.
However, Aristotle does point out that rhetoric and
dialectic can play a role in discovering truth. These
subjects are useful in education (= propaedeutic), and
they can be useful in assessing first principles or pre-
mises. The problem with first principles is that they
have not been demonstrated to be true. Rhetoric and
dialectic cannot demonstrate their truth—nothing can.
But rhetoric and dialectic can assist in comparing the
meaning and effect of statements of first principles,
and there are advantages in being able to do that. It is
easy to explain the particular balance between dialec-
tic and syllogism in the medieval age given its pre-
scientific situation and the dominance of religious per-
spectives in education and social understanding. The
classical model for educated discourse provided in
Aristotle is a complex weaving of social practice and
theoretical understanding that values both. Since
Descartes and Bacon, the balance in our mode of dis-
cussion has been shifting toward emphasizing and
valuing scientific rather than rhetorical reasoning. As
a result, educated discourse has become more arcane
and alienated from the common discourse. The clas-
sical model of the Greeks provides a guide to righting
this balance with the assumption that any educated
person needs to be able to operate in both public and
within-discipline modes. Not being able to do so con-
stitutes a cultural handicap which we must define our
educational principles and educational principles and
methods to correct.
way to extend the human plane in a new dimension.
This leads, almost invariably it seems, to competing
claims as to which extension is the correct one. This is
rather hard to avoid when various of these posited
gods each reveal to a chosen messenger on earth that
it is the one true god and that all others are the inven-
tion of man.
A Collection of Ideas on Systems and their Extensions
continued from page 46
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